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ARGUMENT 
I. NPCA SEEKS REASONED EXERCISE OF AGENCY AUTHORITY AND 
DISCRETION IN ADDRESSING THE UNLAWFUL DISPARITY OF 
VALUES AND INADEQUATE ANALYSIS REFLECTED IN THE NEW 
APPRAISAL OFFERED BY SITLA AS THE BASIS FOR EXCHANGE 188 
In their opening brief, petitioners National Parks Conservation Association and 
William Wolverton (jointly "NPCA" unless otherwise indicated) offered a careful 
statement of the relief they had sought from the Board of Trustees (the" Board") of the 
Utah State Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA"): 
Because Exchange 188 has not yet been validated by an adequate appraisal, 
and fails for inadequate consideration to the County, the SITLA Board should 
exercise its discretion and authority to reconsider the exchange and initiate 
consideration of an alternative disposition for Section 16, giving weight to the 
following highly relevant factors: 
(1) its authority to suspend its approval of the McConkie appraisal while 
pursuing remedies to reverse the previous exchange of deeds; and 
(2) the concerns emphasized by the Court in NPCA v. Board of State Lands 
regarding alternative dispositions that will protect trust lands having important 
noneconomic values, giving full consideration to the statutory preservation and 
protection goals for national park lands, specifically including Sec. 16; and 
(3) the feasibility of structuring a new transaction for disposition of Park 
Section 16, with fair value to the school trust, for conveyance of the section to an 
entity committed to providing such protection. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONERS at 42.1 
1
 In a parallel rulemaking proceeding, which was continued by the Board, NPCA 
had also sought adoption of a general rule that would facilitate consideration of such 
1 
The above relief sought by NPCA was specifically designed to address the injury it claims 
to result from unlawful approval of Exchange 188 on the basis of the McConkie appraisal 
- specifically, SITLA's refusal to recognize the inadequacy of the appraisal and 
unlawfulness of the exchange values as the basis for exercising reasonable discretion to 
consider other options. 
This Court emphasized in National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board 
of State Lands. 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993)("NPCA-T), that it would be "unconscionable" 
for pursuit of trust obligations to sanction destruction of important natural values on trust 
lands, and that, where necessary, the state should structure trust transactions that can 
ensure protection compatibly with trust duties. 869 P.2d at 921. The relief proposed by 
NPCA sought exercise of SITLA's discretion to consider alternatives that would avoid 
injury to those values all but certain to result from consummation of Exchange 188 on the 
basis of an inadequate appraisal and unlawful exchange values. 
The extreme disproportion of value to be conveyed by Garfield County in 
Exchange 188, unlawful in itself, would likely have been revealed as even more extreme 
if the appraisal had determined the value attributed to Section 16 by giving appropriate 
alternative protective transactions. Although NPCA did not contest continuance of that 
proceeding, it explicitly reserved its claim that - a proper lower valuation of Section 16, 
if established in further appraisal proceedings, should be considered by the Board as the 
basis for an alternative exchange or purchase on conditions that will protect the natural 
and aesthetic values of the section while returning fair value to the trust. 
Appellant's Response to Proposed Order at 14-15, R. 459-60. 
2 
weight to the precipitous terrain, regulatory constraints and lack of utility services that 
limit the value of that parcel. Yet, precisely because of the extreme disproportion in these 
exchange values, SITLA claims that its duty to "maximize" trust income compels it to go 
forward with the exchange rather than consider other possibilities that would return fair 
value to the trust while also enabling protection of the natural and scenic values on 
Section 16. Thus, although it acknowledges the unlawfulness of the significant 
disparities in consideration reported by the McConkie appraisal, SITLA brief at 21, 
SITLA is explicit in insisting that its single mission eclipses all other legal concerns: 
Assuming that all of the factual arguments raised by NPCA were true - in short 
that section 16 faced so many constraints that its value was minimal - NPCA was 
not entitled to relief as a matter of law... . Under NPCA, SITLA had the 
obligation to maximize benefits to the school trust. . . . If all of NPCA's factual 
contentions are accepted as true, the 1987 exchange was even more clearly in the 
best interests of the school trust, and must be upheld. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE BOARD OF TRUSTEES ("SITLA brief) at 36-
37. 
Disregarding the substance of NPCA's claims, SITLA also argues that NPCA 
simply seeks to relitigate NPCA-I. Recognizing this Court's urging of the importance of 
arranging dispositions that, consistently with trust obligations, can protect unique scenic 
and natural values, SITLA inexplicably asserts: 
NPCA now argues that this language obligated the SITLA Board in 2005 to 
disregard the favorable economic aspects of the 1987 exchange, and void 
the exchange in favor of some unspecified transaction with a conservation 
entity. 
SITLA brief at 26. 
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That response fails to distinguish between the legal grounds asserted by NPCA for 
challenge to consummation of Exchange 188 and the appropriately nuanced relief sought 
through exercise of SITLA's authority and discretion to develop alternative dispositions 
in light of continuing defects in the land exchange at issue here, It is true that NPCA 
relies on this Court's dictum in NPCA-I as one basis for that proposed relief. But NPCA 
asserts no challenge to the school trust interests protected by that decision, and instead 
seeks to build on this Court's accompanying recognition of the need for mechanisms that, 
compatibly with trust duties, can protect important natural values on trust lands. 
II. THE IRRELEVANCE TO PROPOSED REMEDIES OF SITLA'S DELAY 
IN COMPLYING WITH THE REMAND IN NPCA-I 
SITLA has acknowledged that for more than 12 years the agency took no action at 
all to respond to this Court's order for a new and valid appraisal. SITLA brief at 8 (first 
full paragraph), at 12 (paragraph 12) and at 21 (first full paragraph); see also Transcript of 
Hearing Proceedings, September 13, 2007, at 27-28. Yet it argues that the delay should 
foreclose consideration of the remedies sought by NPCA because "[title to Section 16 has 
been in Garfield County for more than 20 years" and the Board lacks power uto invalidate 
or refuse to recognize a twenty year old conveyance on grounds not addressed in the 
Supreme court's remand." SITLA brief at 23. But SITLA disregards the fact that this 
Court's stay remained in effect until completion of a valid appraisal, 869 P.2d at 923; See 
also Statement of Mr. Mitchell, Transcript of Hearing proceedings, September 13, 2007; 
at 13, R. 392 ("[A]s a legal matter, it is still in effect. I believe it would require a motion 
4 
to the Supreme Court for the stay to be lifted.") and there is no evidence that the County 
showed any interest in or took any steps toward resolving the matter. 
5 
III. SITLA'S HANDS ARE NOT TIED: "LAW OF THE CASE" DOCTRINE 
DOES NOT BAR THE AGENCY FROM ADDRESSING THE ADMITTED 
UNLAWFULNESS OF A 330.% DISPARITY OF VALUES IN EXCHANGE 
188 
While acknowledging the unlawfulness of the valuation disparities reported in the 
McConkie appraisal as the basis for Exchange 188, SITLA argues that its hands are tied. 
NPCA contends that the shackles binding the agency are of its own making, and are not 
so immobilizing as SITLA claims. 
SITLA unavoidably admits the 330.5% valuation disparity in the land valuations 
reported by the McConkie appraisal. It also does not dispute that completing the land 
exchange with this disparity violates this Court's holdings that "local governments may 
not dispose of real property without adequate compensation." SITLA brief at 20; Rather, 
miscasting NPCA's claim as one of "unfairness" to the County rather than outright 
illegality, SITLA brief at 20, SITLA seeks to evade responsibility for addressing that 
illegality on two flawed grounds. 
The "Mandate Rule" does not "lock in" every passing judicial observation 
First, SITLA argues that the "mandate rule" of the "law of the case" doctrine 
utterly bars the agency - and apparently this Court - from addressing the unlawful 
disparity of values reflected in Exchange 188. SITLA brief at 22. It bases that rigid 
position on a manufactured conclusion that the mandate in NPCA-I confined the agency 
narrowly to a single permissible step: obtaining a new and reliable appraisal 
demonstrating proper return to the school trust. Hence, SITLA contends, that mandate 
6 
foreclosed the agency from considering any other issues that might affect the transaction 
- regardless of other illegality the new appraisal may disclose. 
SITLA's narrowly legalistic view of mandate obligations reflects neither a proper 
understanding nor an adequate review of this Court's precedents. The single case relied 
on by SITLA, Thurston v Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (1995), involved an attempt 
to simply relitigate the applicability of a statute that had been relied on by the Court in 
adjudicating a prior appeal, with a remand requiring compliance with the statutory terms. 
On appeal from a new decision, the "mandate rule" branch of "law of the case" was 
applied to foreclose consideration of appellant's claims of exemption from the statute. 
The Court emphasized the clear effect of the mandate rule in the context of that case: 
The lower court must not depart from the mandate, and any change with respect to 
the legal issues governed by the mandate must be made by the appellate court that 
established it or by a court to which it, in turn, owes obedience. [Citations 
omitted.] In addition, the lower court must implement both the letter and the spirit 
of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the 
circumstances it embraces. [Citations omitted.] 
892 P.2d at 1038. Reading that explanation expansively, SITLA contends that the remand 
order in NPCA-I embraced not only a directive to obtain a new and valid appraisal, but 
also a strict prohibition against agency consideration of any other infirmities in, or 
disclosed by, that appraisal. That contention, however, is not divinable from the NPCA-I 
remand order, is not supported by Thurston, and is wholly incompatible with this Court's 
subsequent elaborations on the mandate rule. 
First, Thurston and its underlying facts are easily distinguished from SITLA's 
7 
inflated view of the scope and effect of the mandate rule In Thurston's first appeal, this 
Court had held the County acted unlawfully when it relied on factors not specified by the 
state's County Personnel Management Act as the basis for discharging Thurston, and 
remanded for County application of factors specified by that Act. In Thurston's follow-
on case, the trial court relied on the statutory factors and granted relief from a renewed 
discharge action. On appeal, the County claimed exemption from the Act. In short, the 
County simply sought to relitigate the applicability of the Act on grounds not proffered in 
the original litigation. Understandably, this Court held that "under the law of the case, the 
trial court was required to follow the decision of this Court in Thurston's first appeal with 
respect to the issues that were decided therein." 892 P.2d at 1038. 
Unlike Thurston, there is no sense in which NPCA's claims in this case seek to 
displace or undercut the NPCA-I mandate to obtain a proper appraisal. SITLA tortures the 
NPCA-I opinion to extract an implication that the Court's awareness of a 1.5-to-l 
disparity in the original unlawful appraisal implied a determination that much greater 
value disparities were permissible if the disparity favors the school trust - even, 
apparently, at the level of 3.3-to-l reflected in the McConkie appraisal. The only basis 
SITLA proffers for that conclusion is the observation in NPCA-I that the values recited in 
the original invalid appraisal "appeared to be well in excess of section 16fs value." SITLA 
brief at 20, quoting from NPCA-L 869 P.2d at 923. 
SITLA neglects to consider that the context of that observation was the Court's prior 
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observation that "[gjiven the procedure" of the original appraisal, it "may not accurately 
reflect the fair market value of the parcels." NPCA-I, 869 P.2d at 923. 
SITLA shrinks from actually making its own implied argument - that the Court's 
observation of the previous valuation disparity was somehow an ingredient of the Court's 
mandate, requiring disregard of the current disparity. Instead, SITLA asserts only that the 
Court's mere mention of the earlier disparity shows that it "was aware that the proposed 
exchange could result in an imbalance in value against the County." SITLA brief at 22 
(emphasis added). But the obvious point of the Court's comment was simply to 
emphasize the concern prompting remand - that an independent appraisal was essential 
because the original appraisal generated by the County could not reliably be accepted as 
the basis for valuations that must demonstrate fair return to the school trust. No issue had 
been contested, or even raised, regarding valuation disparity; and nothing in the Court's 
"awareness" of the apparent disparity in the disapproved appraisal implied any constraint 
on SITLA's obligation to comply with whatever legal requirements might be triggered by 
information in a properly independent later appraisal. 
Contrary to SITLA's contentions, NPCA's claims in this case actually honor the 
substance of the earlier mandate. Obviously, the Court ordered a new appraisal because a 
reliable appraisal has an important substantive purpose in an exchange transaction - to 
ensure the validity of the valuations on which it is premised. Although the immediate 
concern in NPCA-I focused on the reliability of the appraisal to ensure proper return to 
9 
the trust, nothing in the case foreclosed consideration of other legal requirements 
triggered by information in a later lawful appraisal. In short, if SITLA accepts* the 
adequacy of the appraisal, it must also take responsibility for the legal implications of the 
information disclosed by the appraisal. 
Indeed, it is SITLA's position that would undercut the mandate. SITLA claims that 
it must disregard the full and legitimate purposes of the reliable appraisal required by 
NPCA-I. Thus, SITLA insists on blinders, narrowly viewing the new appraisal as 
pertinent only in assessing "whether the school trust, not the County, had received 
adequate compensation." SITLA brief at 22. Thus, if the appraisal had disclosed a title 
defect involving a previously overlooked conveyance of Section 16, SITLA's logic would 
apparently require it to disregard the defect because it is "unrelated to whether the school 
trust had received full value." Moreover, SITLA would apparently argue that the 
diminished value of the defective title merely shows that "the 1987 exchange was even 
more clearly in the best interests of the school trust." SITLA brief at 22 and 37. 
Obviously, the Court in NPCA-I was concerned about the adequacy of trust 
compensation because the County's promotion of the first appraisal involved a danger of 
self-interested bias. But nothing in the remand order even hinted that other legal 
implications of information developed in the new appraisal were to be ignored, or that 
consideration of resulting legal problems would conflict with the purposes of the remand. 
The Mandate Rule is pragmatically applied and does not require judicial myopia 
10 
Second, the reach and effect of the mandate rule is not nearly so preclusive and 
uncompromising as SITLA's formulation of that doctrine. Cases subsequent to Thurston 
reflect a pragmatic approach. Even in applying the doctrine in a clear case in Gildea v. 
Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT.. 75, 31 P.3d 543, the Court took pains to emphasize 
that it is "not an inexorable command" and "is not applied inflexibly:" 
Indeed, this court need not apply the doctrine to promote efficiency at the expense 
of the greater interest in preventing unjust results or unwise precedent.... 
Accordingly, the doctrine will generally not be enforced under the following 
exceptional circumstances: 
(1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when 
new evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its 
prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 
Gildea. 2001 Utah 75, ^ 9, 31 P.3d at 546. And while Gildea asserted that the doctrine " is 
waived only for the most cogent of reasons," id., this Court has distinguished between the 
obligation to comply where the doctrine is applicable, and the need for care in defining its 
applicability or the scope of any preclusion. More recently, the Court has made clear that 
a lower court must not allow inflated claims about the scope of a mandate to inhibit 
exercise of its substantive role. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 34, 
98 P.3d 409. 
In Campbell this Court was faced with a remand order from the United States 
Supreme Court requiring it to reconsider the extent of punitive damages to be awarded 
plaintiffs for bad-faith failure of an insurance company to settle earlier auto accident 
litigation within policy limits. Acknowledging a duty of "unwavering fidelity" to the 
11 
Supreme Court's remand order, this Court was nonetheless "skeptical" of the reach 
claimed for that order. Not unlike SITLA, the insurance company claimed that, on 
remand, any new award must be narrowly limited under a "broadly defined" mandate 
rule. This Court rejected that claim because it "elevates all of the statements in the 
Supreme Court's opinion to the status of a holding, thereby binding us to what would 
otherwise be properly deemed dicta." 2004 Utah 34, ^ J6, 98 P.3d at 411. Despite remand 
language much more explicit in its limiting implications than that relied on by SITLA,2 
this Court exercised judgment in interpreting the scope of the remand order and 
concluded that it afforded substantial discretion to exercise substantive authority in 
defining the extent of permissible punitive damages. 
To repeat, the duty to respect an appellate court's remand order requires analysis of 
its terms and purpose, and does not "elevate all the statements in the [appellate courf's] 
opinion to the status of a holding." IdL To similar effect see Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. 
Court, Utah County. 191 P.2d 153, 158 (Utah 1948). 
As to all matters adjudicated by the appellate court, both the trial court and the 
parties are foreclosed from further trying those matters. They become the law of 
the case. But as to matters left open by the appellate court, it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as to 
those matters. 
2
 This Court ultimately approved punitive damages nine times the amount of the 
compensatory award, rejecting the mandate constraint claimed to arise from the Supreme 
Court's observation that the case "likely would justify a punitive damages award at or 
near the amount of compensatory damages." Parsing that language, this Court found in it 
"words of prediction, not direction." 2004 Utah 34 ^ [12, 98 P.3d at412. 
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SITLA has not shown , and cannot show, that any aspect of this Court's remand order in 
NPCA-I required disregard of the serious legal questions raised by the inadequate 
consideration to be received by the County under Exchange 188. 
IV. SITLA'S HANDS ARE NOT TIED: AMPLE OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE 
TO ADDRESS THE UNLAWFUL DISPARITY OF VALUES IN 
EXCHANGE 188 WITHOUT USURPING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
Asserting that NPCA seeks relief from the SITLA Board that would require it "to 
act beyond its jurisdiction," SITLA argues as if the only remedy sought by NPCA was a 
formal determination that the Exchange 188 is "void and unlawful." SITLA brief at 22. 
To the contrary, however, NPCA specifically sought Board consideration and adoption of 
any (or all) of a range of discretionary steps that SITLA could take, short of formally 
adjudicating invalidity, that could facilitate a different and lawful disposition of Section 
16. 
It is true that NPCA's initial pleadings before the SITLA Board variously asserted 
that the inadequate McConkie appraisal, or the improper exchange of values it disclosed, 
were unlawful or "void." However, responding to the Board's claim that invalidating the 
exchange was "beyond the Board's statutory powers," Proposed order at 11, R. 432, 
NPCA suggested that under the broad discretion claimed for SITLA "a range of possible 
remedies are available to SITLA other than claiming jurisdiction to itself void the deed." 
Appellant's Response to Proposed Order at 10, R. 455. 
Arguing that "failure to exert any available discretionary remedies in the face of 
13 
acknowledged illegality constitutes an abuse of discretion/' NPCA urged consideration of 
seven different rational steps, within SITLA's jurisdiction, that the agency could take to 
address the problem. Id. at 10-11. Neither SITLA or the SITLA Board have ever 
responded in any manner to any of those proposed steps; nor have they taken any other 
initiative to address the patent illegality of an exchange consummated on the basis of the 
disparate valuations reported in the McConkie appraisal. No reasons were ever proffered 
for the failure to consider or exercise any remedies within the agency's authority and 
discretion to address the illegality of consideration to the County in Exchange 188.3 Yet 
SITLA's silence is not rationalized as a lack of authority to take the suggested steps - or 
others, short of adjudicating the deeds - to seek resolution of the problem. Rather, the 
SITLA Board merely asserts that "the question of whether Garfield County acted legally 
was properly left to the courts," claiming that under NPCA-L "the appropriate forum for a 
claim that an administrative agency has acted illegally is an action for injunction in the 
district court."4 SITLA brief at 23. 
3
 Indeed, there is no indication that the suggested initiatives, or any others, were 
even considered, because the text of the Board's Final Order was identical to the 
Proposed Order to which NPCA had responded. Compare Proposed Order at 11-13, R. 
432-34, with the Final Order at 11-13, R. 526-28. 
4
 Even if adjudication of the invalidity of the deeds exchanged in 1987 considered 
is a judicial function beyond SITLA's authority, discretionary actions short of that could 
compel the County to take the initiative in seeking a judicial order to resolve the resulting 
"cloud on title." But apparently without reflection or explanation, the Board recoils from 
the idea of inviting "a quick lawsuit from the County," SITLA brief at 23, preferring to 
place the burden of litigation on citizens. 
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SITLA's explanation ignores both the context of its quotation from NPCA-I and the 
subsequent enactment of the statutory authority for, and agency adoption of, regulations 
providing for administrative appeal of S1TLA decisions. 
In context, the language from NPCA-I relied on by the Board was in response to 
NPCA's claim of a right to intervene in the ongoing appraisal proceedings for Exchange 
188. The Court's insistence, at that time, that a judicial injunction action was the proper 
remedy was framed to avert concerns that ready intervention would make such 
proceedings susceptible to delay. 869 P.2d at 914. 
But legislation enacted subsequent to NPCA-I required SITLA to "establish due 
process procedures governing adjudicative proceedings conducted by the administration" 
including subpoena powers, U.C.A. §53C-1-204(3) and 204(9)(c). SITLA was directed, 
inter alia, to "make rules to ensure procedural due process in the resolution of complaints 
concerning actions by the board, director, and the administration," and to "base its final 
actions on findings and conclusions . . . . " U.C.A. §53C-1-204. Pursuant to that directive, 
SITLA adopted its Rule R850-8, attached as Addendum A, providing extensive 
procedures for both informal and formal administrative proceedings, including petitions 
for intervention, which must be granted if the "the petitioner's legal interests may be 
substantially affected" and "the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of 
15 
the adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired . . . ."5 Moreover, despite a 
rule providing that" [t]he board, in its sole discretion, may permit a deviation from this 
rule for good cause," R850-8-500, the Board has taken no action to "permit a deviation" in 
such proceedings from the general intervention rules. Thus, in the legislative process, the 
statutory and rule-based concerns for public processes appear to have prevailed over any 
concerns about interveners' effect on exchange proceedings. 
The extent to which these post-NPCA-I procedural requirements compel full 
opportunity for intervention does not appear to have been litigated. But the detailed and 
mandatory considerations they require to be applied no longer permit reliance on earlier 
concerns about intervention as the basis for summary disregard of NPCA's serious 
proposals for addressing the illegality of disparate exchange values. To the contrary, the 
rules expressly require statements of reasons for the board's decisions. R.850-8-1300, 
subsection 8, available at Addendum A. 
"Abuse of discretion" or "arbitrary and capricious" judicial review under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act at U.C.A §63-46b-16(4)(h)(I) ordinarily requires a 
determination as to whether reasons offered for the agency action in question were 
founded on an "adequate" or "fair and rational basis." Committee of Consumer Services 
5
 The rules structure these provisions for comprehensive application in both formal 
and informal adjudicative proceedings. The separate provisions governing both types of 
proceedings expressly adopt the intervention requirements of R850-8-1300, subsection 7, 
available infra at Addendum A. 
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v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 2003 Utah 29, f 13, 75 P.3d 481,485-86. In this 
case, however, the only reason offered - prior hesitancy about the role of interveners - has 
been displaced by statute and rule. In the absence of some cogent explanation for 
disregarding available discretionary authority, the decision by the SITLA Board lacks 
rational basis for declining to address the valuation disparity. 
V. SITLA WOULD VASTLY WIDEN THE REALM OF RES JUDICATA BY 
PRECLUDING LATER CLAIMS IF PURE SPECULATION MIGHT HAVE 
SUPPLIED AN ARGUMENT FOR A SIMILAR EARLIER CLAIM 
SITLA does not contest the factual basis for NPCA's contention that, at the time of 
NPCA-L it could not have presented its current unlawful disparity claims because "the 
original appraisals were held invalid . . . and the McConkie Appraisal did not exist." 
SITLA brief at 24. Admitting that, it argues NPCA could still have litigated a claim that 
the County was "giving up more than it was getting" or that there was "an imbalance in 
favor of the school trust." SITLA brief at 25. However, SITLA apparently does not 
recognize that it's suggested refraining of the possible claims still relies on the assumption 
that the original appraisal provided a valid basis for determining (and litigating) the 
existence and effect of an "imbalance." 
More fundamentally, SITLA presents no precedent even hinting that a court's bare 
awareness of facts obliquely recognized in an earlier case could somehow preclude later 
litigation of a claim based on analogous but different facts that were not in existence or 
litigable at the time of the prior case. Obviously, such an approach would radically change 
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the basic foundation for the res judicata doctrine, now anchored in a basic requirement that 
a precluded claimant must have had reasonable opportunity to assert the challenged claim 
in a prior case. Zufelt v. Haste, Inc.. 2006 UT App 326,1J15, 142 P.3d 594, 598. (Disputed 
ownership interest in company "was not the central issue" in earlier case and related facts 
had been "only superficially addressed," so "we cannot say that [party] had an opportunity 
to completely and fully litigate the issue.") 
Even SITLA's attempt to state its res judicata position demonstrates its extremity. 
SITLA would impose a theoretical duty on NPCA that would have required it, when 
NPCA-I was filed, to assert a claim based on values reported in the very appraisal it was 
challenging as unreliable. Alternatively, SITLA would require NPCA to assert a 
generalized claim that the County was unlawfully "giving up more than it was getting," 
SITLA brief at 25, apparently to be based on speculation about the values that might be 
reported in a new appraisal if the challenge to validity of the first appraisal were 
successful. 
SITLA's new thesis would cast a hugely enlarged res judicata net. It might even 
temporarily diminish some judicial caseloads. But the burden would obviously be shifted 
to interminable law and motion activity at the pleadings stage as counsel dispute whether 
unsupported speculations state a claim. 
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VI, SITLA'S BRIEF IN THIS COURT FOR THE FIRST TIME BELATEDLY 
CHALLENGES FACTUAL PREMISES FOR NPCA'S STANDING 
ALLEGATIONS THAT WERE NOT CONTESTED OR WERE LEFT 
UNLITIGATED BELOW 
In this Court, SITLA's brief for the first time challenges NPCA's satisfaction of 
"traditional" standing requirements by demanding affidavits in support of the standing 
allegations asserted in NPCA's original Appeal From Final Agency Action, filed 29 
September 2006. Ignoring the fact that, before the Board, those allegations either were not 
contested or were acknowledged as issues of fact to be litigated, SITLA argues that 
petitioners failed to establish the basis for traditional standing because "no affidavits from 
either NPCA or Mr. Wolverton appear in the record." Hence, it contends, they "have not 
met their burden of establishing that they would be adversely affected by the challenged 
actions." SITLA brief at 28-29. 
To begin with, that argument disregards this Court's requirement that arguments on 
appeal must be shown to have been asserted below. Yet throughout the litigation below 
SITLA challenged only the legal basis for, but not the factual elements of NPCA's 
standing allegations. Only once in addressing those allegations did SITLA even discuss 
the factual aspects of the allegations, and then without contesting or even addressing their 
basis.6 
6
 In its Memorandum In Support of State of Utah's Motion To Dismiss Appeal of 
Agency Action dated November 10, 2006, R. 92, SITLA acknowledged petitioners' 
claims of "impairments to their recreational interests, resulting from the development of 
Section 16" and their "substantial interests in experiencing and enjoying scenic and 
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Similarly, both the Board's Proposed Order and Final Order considered and denied 
petitioners' standing solely on the ground that, as a matter of legal policy, they had no 
legal right to intervene in the exchange transaction and therefore "do not have standing to 
attack SITLA's substantive internal decisionmaking concerning the specific values of the 
lands committed to a state land exchange." Proposed Order at 16-17, R. 437-38; Order at 
16-17, R. 531-32. Apart from that disposition, the Board's orders made no determination 
concerning the standing allegations asserted in NPCA's appeal or the factual grounds for 
those allegations. 
NPCA recognizes, of course, that the jurisdictional question of standing may be 
raised at any time. But here there is no foundation for a challenge because the Board's 
procedure and the record in this case clearly fail to satisfy the requirement of U.R.C.P. 
56(c) that they must "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ." 
Indeed, under that standard, as demonstrated below, the record would readily support an 
affirmative finding that NPCA has satisfied the interest and related prospect of injury 
requirements for standing. (Injury and redressability discussed further at POINT VII, 
infra.) 
recreational values provided by Capitol Reef National Park . . .including the unspoiled 
natural and scenic values adjacent to the Burr Trail in Section 16." It also acknowledged 
Wolverton's claim that he was also "injured by loss of value in County property due to his 
status as a County resident." However, SITLA questioned these claims only by asserting 
that they "do not meet the degree of specificity required" and that petitioners' substantive 
claims "contradict existence of any injury." Id at 14-15, R. 105-06. 
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Apart from the lack of affidavits, SITLA did not challenge the adequacy of NPCA's 
interest in and involvement with the Section 16 and national park lands it seeks to protect 
in this matter, or that of its members. Thus, except for questioning the legal adequacy of 
NPCA's "injury" and redressability," discussed infra, no issues were raised about the 
adequacy of NPCA's standing allegations in its APPEAL FROM FINAL AGENCY 
ACTION BY THE SITLA DIRECTOR DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 2006 IN RE 
EXCHANGE 188, at 3-5, R. 30-32. 
SITLA's belated demand for standing affidavits ignores the fact that SITLA has 
never disputed the factual premises of NPCA's standing allegations. Only in its brief to 
this Court did SITLA belatedly challenge the absence from the record of affidavits 
supporting petitioners' standing. Following are the relevant actions and filings: 
(1) At the suggestion of the hearing examiner, and before SITLA filed an answer, 
counsel for SITLA and NPCA entered into a "Joint Stipulated Scheduling Order," R.87 
which provided that SITLA's answer to NPCA's appeal would be due on November 10, 
2006, and that "by December 1, 2006" -
2. Both parties shall exchange proposed issues of fact and law to be determined at 
the hearing in this matter. Each party shall identify the issues and facts, if any, in 
dispute [and] identify issues of fact for which discovery is necessary.... 
3. The parties are to file a joint statement of issues on which there is agreement 
between the parties and delineating issues on which there is disagreement no later 
than January 16, 2007. 
4. The hearing examiner will thereafter determine such further scheduling and 
proceedings as are appropriate. [Emphasis added.] 
(2) Pursuant to the above stipulation, on December 8, 2006, NPCA was served with 
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"SITLA'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS TO BE PRESENTED AT THE 
HEARING IN THE CONSOLIDATED MATTER OF PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR 
REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION IN RE: EXCHANGE 188 AND RULEMAKING." At 
pages 6-7 (paragraphs 34-36), the Statement recited, but did not question, the specific 
standing allegations in NPCA's appeal. It also identified "Issues Before the Board" at 
pages 9-11, but listed only legal issues. Moreover, the accompanying forwarding letter 
explicitly recited that "At this time, SITLA continues to maintain that there are no issues 
of fact for which discovery is necessary, or for which an evidentiary hearing is required." 
Letter dated December 8, 2006, from Thomas A. Mitchell to Wayne G. Petty and Bill 
Lockhart. (Emphasis added.) The statement and letter were erroneously omitted from the 
record, but are attached to this brief as Addendum B. 
(3) Pursuant to the above stipulation, on December 12, 2006 (within an agreed extension 
of time for filing), NPCA served on SITLA its PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON 
BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION AND 
WILLIAM WOLVERTON REGARDING ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW TO BE 
DETERMINED IN THE ABOVE MATTER. Among the "Issues Of Fact," listed bv 
NPCA in that statement were "Facts relevant to detennination of the 'standing' of NPCA 
and William Wolverton, including facts regarding" four specific detailed statements of 
standing-pertinent factual issues. NPCA's STATEMENT was also erroneously omitted 
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from the record, but was included as an addendum to petitioners' opening brief, and is 
again included as Addendum C to this brief. 
(4) Instead of answering, on November 10, 2006, SITLA filed a Motion To Dismiss For 
Failure To State Cause of Action. SITLA's supporting Memorandum recited certain of 
NPCA's standing allegations but did not challenge the underlying factual basis for those 
claims, asserting only that they "do not meet the degree of specificity required" and that 
petitioners' substantive claims "contradict existence of any injury." Memorandum In 
Support of State of Utah's Motion To Dismiss Appeal of Agency Action at 14-15, R. 105-
06.7 
(5) In its Final Order, the Board recited its "Standard Of Review" for SITLA's Motion To 
Dismiss, concluding that: 
Where, as here, the parties have chosen to submit materials outside the pleadings, 
the Board may treat the pending Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary 
Judgment under U.R.C.P. 56. . . . the Board must consider only facts that are not in 
dispute [citation omitted] and may rule in favor of the movant only if it appears as a 
matter of law that the petitioners cannot prevail. 
Final Order at 2-3, R. 517-18. 
Based on the above record, the Board proceeded to adjudicate NPCA's standing 
solely on legal and policy grounds, abjuring any findings on the factual premises for 
7
 Also see SITLA's emphasis on legal standards for harm (and mischaracterization 
of NPCA claims) in Reply To National Parks Conservation Association's Opposition To 
State of Utah's Motion To Dismiss Appeal of Agency Action at 2, R. 286, asserting that 
NPCA's argument "is further premised upon the 'factual' assertion that Petitioners are 
harmed because 'but for' the '2005 appraisal' they are entitled today to purchase the 
Section 16 land . . . " - but disputing only that legal contention. 
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standing. Not only does SITLA lack any foundation for its belated challenge to NPCA's 
standing allegations, but both expressly and by the content of its arguments before the 
Board, it has admitted that it does not dispute the facts underlying those allegations. 
VII. "ACTUAL INJURY" CAUSED BY APPROVAL OF EXCHANGE 188 WAS 
ASSERTED AND DEMONSTRATED BY NPCA, AND WOULD BE 
REDRESSED BY THE RELIEF IT SEEKS 
Through its appeal to the Board, NPCA sought a remedy for the unlawful 
valuations and inadequate appraisal approved by SITLA as the basis for Exchange 188, 
urging that SITLA be required to exercise its discretion and authority to consider 
alternative transactions that would protect the natural values of Capitol Reef National Park 
while still providing fair return to the school trust, See supra at 1-4. 
Similar relief was first sought through a letter to SITLA, preceding NPCA's 
administrative appeal. Emphasizing the inadequacy of the McConkie appraisal and the 
unlawfulness of the exchange consideration it reflected, the letter requested SITLA to 
Initiate action for alternative disposition of the disputed school section either by 
purchase or lease by the State of Utah, the National Park Service, or by a private 
conservation organization on terms that will ensure protection of the section's 
noneconomic values while returning fair value to SITLA for the school fund. 
Letter dated August 29, 2006, from Wayne G. Petty to Kevin Carter, Director, SITLA, at 
2, R.2. 
Petitioners' interests supporting standing to seek that relief, and current injuries to 
those interests making relief imperative, were fully asserted in petitioners' initial Appeal 
From Final Agency Action (29 September 2006), R. 28. NPCA also emphasized its 
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extensive efforts in specific administrative and judicial actions to protect these lands, as 
well as its special interest in protecting the result it achieved in NPCA-I. Appeal at 3-4. R. 
30-31. 
NPCA also emphasized its interest in averting imminent and immediate threats to 
lands within Section 16. Specifically, its Appeal included a detailed explanation, 
supported by an accompanying affidavit, demonstrating specific threats and damage to 
these lands arising from Garfield County's acquisition of Section 16 - including 
destructive action recently taken by the County: 
The Director's action will further injure NPCA by purporting to establish the validity of 
the conveyance of Section 16 to Garfield County, thereby permitting the County to 
undertake a wide range of possible development actions adverse to protection of the 
natural, scenic, aesthetic, and recreational values of the areas of the Park on and 
surrounding Section 16, and compelling NPCA to pursue further remedies for such 
development. Garfield County has already undertaken unlawful action that confirms that 
threat by digging substantial quantities of "borrow" material out of Section 16 for use in 
road construction activity on the Burr Trail without authorization or opportunity for 
assessment of impacts by the National Park Service. See Affidavit of William J. Lockhart. 
Appeal at 5 (emphasis added), R. 32. The referenced affidavit, appended to the NPCA 
Appeal, detailed a report by the Superintendent of Capitol Reef National Park, further 
confirmed by a Resource Management employee of the Park. The Superintendent 
advised that a road construction crew working for Garfield County had recently 
used road construction equipment to enter a previously undisturbed area of Section 
16, and had removed substantial quantities of "borrow" material from Section 16 
for use in laying new culverts and other water diversions on the road commonly 
referred to as the Burr Trail, which traverses Section 16. 
Affidavit of William J. Lockhart, 29 September 2006, paragraph 2, R 38. That report was 
further confirmed by National Park Service employee Dave Worthington, who also 
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transmitted pictures of the above disturbance that are appended to the affidavit. l± at 
paragraph 3, R. 38. Neither SITLA nor Garfield County have contested this information 
or made any claim that the development work was authorized, despite the stay entered by 
this Court pending compliance with its mandate in NPCA-L 
CONCLUSION 
NPCA has demonstrated that the injury and further threats to NPCA's interests in 
protecting the noneconomic values of Capitol Reef National Park within Section 16 are 
real and imminent. Those threats could be averted or diminished by the administrative 
remedy NPCA has sought. To that end, NPCA asks this Court to enter an order requiring 
the Board to reject the unlawful terms on which SITLA would consummate Exchange 188 
and require SITLA (1) to obtain an adequate appraisal of Section 16, and (2) on the basis 
of a valid appraisal, exercise its authority and discretion to consider lawful alternatives for 
disposition of Section 16 that will protected noneconomic values while returning fair 
market value to the school trust. 
Respectfully submitted this *^J day of June, 2008. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Le<#. Pett^  ' Wayne (a. etty 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM A 
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE RULES PROMULGATED BY 
THE UTAH STATE INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION 
EFFECTIVE MAY 1,2008 
[Available at http://www.rules.utah.gov/publicat/code/r850/r850.htm] 
[Cited portions identical to rules adopted and in force since at least January 1, 2008] 
Rule R850-8. Adjudicative Proceedings. 
As in effect on May 1, 2008 
[Available at http://www.rules.utah.gov/publicat/code/r850/r850-008.htm] 
R850-8-100. Authorities. 
This rule implements Sections 6, 8, 10, and 12 of the Utah Enabling Act, Articles X and 
XX of the Utah Constitution, and Subsections 53C-1-204(3), 53C-l-204(10)(c), and 
Section 53C-1-304. 
R850-8-300. Definitions. 
1. Adjudicative proceeding - means a review by the board of a final Trust Lands 
Administration action that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or 
other legal interests of one or more identifiable persons. 
2. Board - means School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration Board of Trustees. 
References to the board shall also apply to any hearing examiner appointed unless the 
context of rules requires otherwise. 
3. Final agency action - means a written detennination by the Trust Lands Administration 
of the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more 
identifiable persons. The detennination shall be in any fonn deemed appropriate by the 
Trust Lands Administration, including but not limited to, a notation on the director's 
minutes, a narrative record of decision, or a decision letter. 
4. Party - means the Trust Lands Administration or other person commencing an 
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons pennitted by the board to intervene 
in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or Trust Lands Administration 
rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
* * * * 
R850-8-500. Deviation from Rules. 
The board, in its sole discretion, may pennit a deviation from this rule for good cause, 
including but not limited to situations where compliance is impractical or unnecessary, or 
in the furtherance of due process or the statutory obligations of the board. 
* * * * 
R850-8-1200. Procedures for Informal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
* * * * 
6. Intervention shall be in accordance with R850-8-1400. 
R850-8-1000. Appeal of Final Agency Action. 
1. The Trust Lands Administration may by rule specifically designate certain categories of 
Trust Lands Administration actions that are not subject to appeal. 
* * * * 
R850-8-1300. Procedures for Formal Adjudicative Proceedings. 
* 5}C * * 
7. Intervention shall be in accordance with R850-8-1400. 
8. Orders. 
(a) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any post-hearing 
papers permitted by the board, the board shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
I) a statement of the board's findings of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record 
in the adjudicative proceedings, or on facts officially noted; 
ii) a statement of the board's conclusions of law; 
iii) a statement of the reasons for the board's decision; 
iv) a statement of any relief ordered by the board; 
v) a notice of any right to judicial review of the order available to aggrieved parties; 
* * * * 
R850-8-1400. Informal or Formal Adjudicative Proceedings - Intervention. 
1. Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in an 
adjudicative proceeding with the Trust Lands Administration. 
* * * * 
3. The board shall grant a petition for intervention if it determines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the formal adjudicative 
proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative 
proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing intervention. 
* * * * 
R850-8-1800. Judicial Review - Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 
1. A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of a final order issued in an adjudicative 
proceeding, except where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
2. A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available, except that a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if any statute or rule states that exhaustion is not required. 
* * * * 
Rule R850-90. Land Exchanges. 
As in effect on May 1, 2008 
R850-90-100. Authorities. 
This rule implements Sections 6, 8, 10, and 12 of the Utah Enabling Act, Articles X and 
XX of the Utah Constitution, and Sections 53C-l-302(l)(a)(ii) and 53C-4-101(l) which 
authorize the Director of the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration to 
specify application procedures and review criteria for the exchange of trust lands. 
R850-90-500. Determination for the Exchange of Trust Lands. 
* * * * 
4. Applicants desiring reconsideration of agency action relative to exchange 
determinations may petition for review pursuant to agency rule. 
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J o n M Huntsman, J r 
Governor 
Kevin S Carter 
Director 
State of Utah 
School and Institutional 
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
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December 8, 2006 
Wayne G. Petty 
Moyle & Draper, P.C. 
City Centre I 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Bill Lockhart 
University of Utah 
SJ. Quinney College of Law 
332 South 1400 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730 
Re: Amended Exchange of Proposed Issues of Fact and Law 
Dear Bill and Wayne: 
As per the Joint Stipulated Scheduling Order in the consolidated matter of 
Petitioners' Appeal from SITLA Agency Action, please find enclosed, as amended, 
SITLA's proposed statement of stipulated issues of fact and law to be applied at the 
hearing in this matter. At this time, SITLA continues to maintain that there are no issues 
of fact for which discovery is necessary, or for which an evidentiary hearing is required. 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions. /Thank you. >ns. /ln< 
Sincerely yours, 
Thomas A. Mitchei 
Senior Attorney 
cc: Barry Huntington 
Enclosure 
SITLA'S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS TO BE PRESENTED AT THE 
HEARING IN THE CONSOLIDATED MATTER OF PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR 
REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION IN RE: EXCHANGE 188 AND RULEMAKING 
Background Information Regarding Exchange 188 
1. On December 21, 1987, the Board of State Lands & Forestry approved State Exchange 
No. 188 ("Exchange 188"). Exchange 188 conveyed a Section 16 of school trust land inside 
Capitol Reef National Park for Garfield County ("County") lands in Sections 5 and 6 in the 
vicinity of Bryce Canyon Airport ("Bryce Parcel"), Section 28 in Johns Valley ("Johns Valley 
Parcel") and Lots 24 and 25 within Richfield City Industrial Park ("Richfield Parcel"). For 
convenience, the three parcels within Garfield County are, hereafter, collectively referred to as 
"County Parcels." 
2. The Division of State Lands and Forestry ("Division"), SITLA's predecessor agency, 
relied on appraisals of Section 16 and County Parcels as submitted by the County in support of 
its application for the Exchange 188. 
3. The original appraisal valued Section 16 at $65,000 and the County Parcels at $98,500. 
The original appraisal indicated an exchange value ratio in favor of the Trust of 150%. 
4. Section 16 was conveyed by the State of Utah ("State") to the County by patent dated 
December 24, 1987. 
5. The County conveyed by Warranty Deed the Bryce Parcel and Johns Valley Parcel on 
December 16, 1987. The County conveyed by Warranty Deed the Richfield Parcel on December 
22, 1987. 
6. NPCA opposed Exchange 188 and subsequently filed with the Utah Supreme Court a 
writ of review appealing from the Board of State Lands and Forestry's order denying its petition 
for intervention and from nine administrative declaratory rulings issued by the Division in 
connection with the Division's decision to pursue Exchange 188. 
NPCA v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993) 
7. The Court reviewed NPCA's claims in NPCA v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 
(Utah 1993). 
8. The Court set forth standing requirements where "the requisite personal stake to 
challenge a governmental action turns on (1) the existence of an adverse impact on the plaintiffs 
rights, (2) a causal relationship between the governmental action that is challenged and the 
adverse impact on the plaintiffs rights, and (3) the likelihood that the relief requested will 
redress the injury claimed. Society of Professional Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1172-73." Id. at 913. 
9. The Court concluded that the Director of the Division ("Director") correctly denied 
NPCA's petition to intervene because "the land exchange negotiation was not a proceeding in 
which NPCA was entitled to intervene," consistent with trust obligations. NPCA at 914. 
10. The Court concluded that the Director, pursuant to trust obligations, correctly declined to 
answer two declaratory rulings concerning the Board's practices and participation in exchange 
proceedings. NPCA at 916. 
11. The Court affirmed the Director's responses to three declaratory rulings concerning the 
degree to which the Director considers non-economic factors and policies in making land 
exchange decisions. NPCA at 916. 
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12. The Court concluded that the Director erred in refusing to respond to three declaratory 
rulings regarding the Division's appraisal process. NPCA at 916. The Court, subsequently, 
evaluated and responded to these requests. NPCA at 921-922. 
13. The Court held that "the Board did not breach its trust duties by refusing to give priority 
to the scenic, aesthetic, and recreational values of section 16 over economic values when it 
approved the land exchange." NPCA at 921. 
14. The Court held that "the Division breached its trust duty by not securing appraisals for 
both section 16 and Garfield County's land from appraisers either retained or employed by the 
Division." NPCA at 922. 
15. The Court remanded the "case to the Division for a determination of whether the 
appraised values of section 16 and the Garfield County lands offered in exchange represent the 
full value of those lands. The stay presently in effect will continue until the Division makes the 
requisite determinations that the value of the land exchanged for section 16 is adequate under its 
trust obligations." NPCA at 923. 
The Independent Appraisal, NPCA's Request for Rulemaking and SITLA's Agency 
Actions of September 15, 2006 and October 18,2006 
16. In 1994, the Utah legislature terminated the Division's management of state trust lands 
and subsequently created SITLA, an independent agency, to assume trust land management 
functions on July 1, 1994. 
17. Pursuant to the Court's order on remand in NPCA, SITLA in 2005 commissioned an 
independent Restricted Use appraisal of Section 16 and the County Parcels from the firm of 
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Morley and McConkie, L.C. ("Morley & McConkie"). The Morley & McConkie August 25, 
2005, Restricted Use Appraisal ("Appraisal") determined values of Section 16 and the County 
Parcels as of June 23, 2005. 
18. The Appraisal values Section 16 at $200,000 and the County Parcels at $661,200. The 
Appraisal indicates a current exchange value ratio in favor of the Trust of 330.5%. 
19. The Appraisal was provided to all original parties to the NPCA litigation. 
20. On August 29, 2006, in a letter from Wayne Petty to Kevin Carter, NPCA stated 
objections to the Appraisal in support of Exchange 188 and to vacating the stay. NPCA 
submitted a review of the Appraisal ("Review"), prepared by J. Philip Cook, MAI/CRE, and 
Virginia H. Hylton, Appraiser, which evaluated the Appraisal's compliance with the Appraisal 
Foundation's Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP") and with the 
Appraisal Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practice. 
21. The Review concluded that the Appraisal "is compliant with USPAP and with the 
Appraisal Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practice." Review at 4. 
22. Along with the Review, NPCA submitted a Petition for a Rule Change ("Petition") 
requesting that "SITLA adopt a rule to implement the Utah Supreme Court's dictum in National 
Parks." Letter from Wayne G. Petty to Kevin Carter, 10/18/06. 
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23. On August 30, 2006, in a letter from Mr. Petty to Mr. Carter, NPCA corrected its initial 
Petition to remove all parties to the Petition except NPCA. 
24. On September 8, 2006, in a letter from Mr. Carter to Mr. Petty, SITLA responded to 
NPCA's letter of 08/29/06 and informed NPCA that (1) the stay issued by the Supreme Court 
was against the County, not SITLA, (2) SITLA did not intend to participate in any determination 
regarding the stay, and (3) the express language of the NPCA ruling requires SITLA to revisit 
Exchange 188 only under the limited conditions of the Court's remand order. 
25. On September 9, 2006, in a letter from Tom Mitchell, SITLA attorney, to Mr. Petty, 
SITLA notified NPCA of deficiencies in its Petition pursuant to Utah Administrative Rule R15-
2-4. 
26. On September 15, 2006, SITLA's Director took formal action and determined the 
Appraisal's value ratio to have provided full value to SITLA, in compliance with the Supreme 
Court's order in NPCA and with SITLA's trust obligations to the State and to trust beneficiaries. 
27. SITLA notified parties to the NPCA case of its acceptance of the independent Appraisal 
of land involved in Exchange 188. 
28. On September 18, 2006, NPCA resubmitted its Petition in compliance with Utah 
Administrative Rules. 
29. On September 29, 2006, NPCA submitted its appeal of SITLA's action of September 15, 
2006, approving the Appraisal in connection with Exchange 188 ("Appraisal Appeal"). 
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30. After review and consideration of the Rulemaking Petition, SITLA denied NPCA's 
request for rulemaking and provided reasons for such denial in correspondence from Kevin 
Carter to Wayne Petty, dated October 5, 2006. 
31. NPCA appealed SITLA's decision denying its Petition on October 18, 2006 
("Rulemaking Appeal"). 
Petitioners' Appeal 
32. Petitioners' appeal of SITLA's acceptance of the independent Appraisal was consolidated 
with NPCA's appeal of SITLA's decision regarding its rulemaking petition (both matters are, 
hereafter, collectively referred to as the "Appeal"). 
33. Petitioners advance five claims in the consolidated Appeal: (1) the County improperly 
conveyed County Parcels for inadequate consideration; (2) SITLA improperly accepted County 
Parcels; (3) SITLA did not obtain an appropriate appraisal; (4) SITLA did not reconsider 
Exchange 188 based on non-economic values; and (5) SITLA denied the rulemaking petition in 
error. 
34. Petitioners state "NPCA's members have substantial interests in experiencing and 
enjoying scenic and recreational values provided by Capitol Reef National Park (the "Park"), 
specifically including the unspoiled natural and scenic values of the Park lands adjacent to the 
Burr Trail in Section 16." Appraisal Appeal at 3. 
35. Petitioners state NPCA is injured by SITLA's decision to accept the Appraisal's 
valuations of Section 16 and County Parcels involved in Exchange 188 because "NPCA 
members would experience significant impairment of the qualities they seek in these areas if 
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development of Section 16 were undertaken in the manner contemplated by the Report relied on 
by the SITLA Director in approving the valuations of Section 16 and the lands proffered in 
exchange for that Section in Exchange 188." Id. 
36. Mr. Wolverton also states that he "uses and enjoys the scenic, natural, recreational and 
aesthetic values of Capitol Reef National Park, specifically including the area embracing Section 
16. He is also appealing the actions of SITLA's director [in approving Appraisal values] because 
of his belief that ownership and ensuing development of that section by Garfield County or 
persons acquiring portions of that property from Garfield County would significantly impair the 
quality of his experience and enjoyment of that area." Appraisal Appeal at 5. 
37. Petitioners state that the Appraisal did not consider the "significant constraints on 
development activity" resulting from the rocky and steep terrain, the absence of water and 
utilities and federal regulatory constraints. Appraisal Appeal at 9. 
38. Petitioners state that "[m]uch of Section 16 consists of vertical or near-vertical cliffs or 
extremely steep slopes which would render infeasible the development scenarios relied on by the 
Report as the basis for its calculation of values." Appraisal Appeal at 7. 
39. Petitioners state that federal regulations "to protect the natural, scenic, aesthetic and 
recreational values of the Park significantly limit both modes of access to and the kinds of 
development that could occur within Section 16." Appraisal Appeal at 8. 
SITLA'S STATEMENT OF LAW TO BE DETERMINED AT THE HEARING IN THE 
CONSOLIDATED MATTER OF PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF 
AGENCY ACTION IN RE: EXCHANGE 188 AND RULEMAKING 
7 
Relevant Statutes And Administrative Rules Governing Issues To Be Decided 
1. Administrative Rule 850-8-1000, governing appeals of final agency action, requires 
Petitioners to state "any statute, rule, contract provision, or board policy which the final agency 
action is alleged to violate." R850-8-1000(2)(b)(ii). 
2. Administrative Rule 15-2-5, to which the Director is bound in responding to public 
rulemaking petitions, requires "[t]he agency head or designee shall: (1) review and consider the 
petition; (2) write a response to the petition stating: (i) that the petition is denied and reasons for 
denial, or (ii) the date when the agency is initiating a rule change consistent with the intent of the 
petition; and (c) send the response to the petitioner within 30 days of receipt of the petition. 
3. "The director has broad authority to: (i) manage the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration in fulfillment of its purpose; and (ii) establish fees, procedures, and rules 
consistent with general policies prescribed by the board of trustees." Utah Code Annotated 
§53C-l-302(l)(a). 
4. "The board shall establish policies for the management of the School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Administration, [and such] policies shall: (i) be consistent with the Utah Enabling 
Act, the Utah Constitution, and state law; [and] (ii) reflect undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries 
consistent with fiduciary duties." U.C.A. §53C-l-204(l)(a)-(b). 
5. "Within the limits prescribed by Sections 63-46a-3 and 63-46a-12.1, an agency has fxill 
discretion regarding the substantive content of its rules. The division has authority over 
nonsubstantive content under Subsections 63-46a-10(2) and (3), and 63-46a-10.5(2) and (3), 
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rulemaking procedures, and the physical format of rules for compilation in the Utah 
Administrative Code." Administrative Rule 15-3-2(4). 
6. "NPCA did not have a legal interest in whether the Board and Division acted properly 
within their respective policy-making and administrative duties under Adkins v. Division of State 
Lands, 719 P.2d 524 (Utah 1986)." NPCA at 916. 
Issues Before the Board 
1. Does Petitioners' first claim, asserting the County violated statutory and constitutional 
obligations to ensure that it receives fair value as adequate compensation for disposition of its 
property by virtue of Exchange 188 in 1987, state a cause of action against SITLA by reason of 
its acceptance of a review appraisal? 
2. Does Petitioners' second claim, asserting that SITLA cannot lawfully accept or hold title 
to lands or benefit from or participate in the 1987 Exchange 188 have any basis in applicable law 
allegedly violated by SITLA by its action of September 15, 2006, that is, accepting independent 
Appraisal values on remand for Section 16 and County Parcels and thus state a cause of action 
against SITLA? 
3. If intended as a claim against SITLA, is Petitioners' second claim, having been 
previously litigated in NPCA v. Board where the Court found that the County intended to give 
and the Division to receive lands of greater value than what the County received in the 1987 
exchange (See NPCA at 921), barred by collateral estoppel? 
4. Does Petitioners' third claim, asserting that "SITLA did not obtain an appraisal" and that 
the Appraisal overvalues Section 16 because it contemplates unreasonable development of the 
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land, (See Appraisal Appeal at 6-9), demonstrate violation of any applicable law and thus state a 
cause of action against SITLA where the following allegations of Petitioners negate the claim: 
(A.) Petitioners' Review expressly states that SITLA's independent Appraisal uis 
compliant with USPAP and with the Appraisal Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice." Review at 4; and 
(B.) Petitioners' assert injury to recreational interests resulting from the development 
of Section 16 as contemplated by the Appraisal and thus, impossibly declare that Section 16 
development is both unfeasible and injurious. 
5. Is Petitioners' third claim, indicating improper exchange ratios in favor of the trust, 
barred by collateral estoppel because the exchange ratio was always in favor of the trust and 
Petitioners did not raise the issue 20 years ago when all claims that could have been raised by the 
parties to the exchange were finally litigated in NPCA1 
6. Does Petitioners' fourth claim, asserting that SITLA violated a "duty mandated" by the 
NPCA Court by accepting Appraisal values pursuant to Court order and by not reconsidering 
Exchange 188 in favor of non-economic factors, disclose any applicable law SITLA allegedly 
violated and thus state a cause of action against SITLA where the: 
(A.) Petitioners have extracted dictum language from the NPCA opinion and 
transformed it into a "duty;" 
(B.) NPCA concedes in its Petition for Rulemaking that such "duty" is actually 
"dictum" (See Petty Letter of 10/18/06); and 
(C.) The NPCA Court, having ruled on this issue, concluded: in the sentence 
immediately following the passage Petitioners choose to characterize as dictum, that the 
Division did assign adequate consideration and priority to appropriate "aesthetic and 
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recreational values" in approving Exchange 188 as consistent with its trust obligations, {See 
NPCA at 921)? 
7. Is Petitioners' fourth claim, having been previously litigated in NPCA v. Board where the 
Court concluded that the Division should consider, but not prioritize, non-economic factors over 
its duty to maximize economic return, as that would be "contrary to the duties imposed on the 
state and the Division under the school land trust," {See NPCA at 921), barred by collateral 
estoppel and res judicata? 
8. Does Petitioners' fifth claim, asserting errors in the Director's judgment due to personal 
dissatisfaction with SITLA's decision and statement of reasons supporting its denial of NPCA's 
Petition for Rulemaking {See Carter Letter of 10/05/06), allege a violation of any applicable law 
by SITLA in its rulemaking discretion and thus state a cause of action against SITLA where: 
(A.) The Director complied with the requirements of the Administrative Rule 15-2-5, 
governing SITLA's response to public rulemaking petitions, in a manner consistent with the 
management authority and trust principles set forth in U.C.A. §53C-l-302 and §53C-l-204 
and in Rl 5-3-2; and 
(B.) Petitioners do not assert the Director's decision was either arbitrary or capricious, 
but rather that the Director employed interpretive readings different from those asserted as 
NPCA's preferred readings. 
(C.) The exercise of the Director's discretionary functions requires only a showing that 
there is rational basis for the Director's action? 
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ADDENDUM C 
HARDIN A. WHITNEY 
din©>moy!elawf»rm com 
O. W O O D MOYLE III 
wood @> moylelawf irm. com 
WAYNE G. PETTY 
wayne @ moylelawf «rm. com 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Senior Attorney 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
State of Utah 
675 East 500 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-2818 
Re: Appeals Regarding Exchange 188 and Rule Making 
Request; 
Proposed Issues of Fact and Law 
Dear Tom: 
Please find enclosed NPCA's and Wolverton's statement 
of issues of fact and law. As you will see, there are various 
issues of fact for which we believe discovery is necessary or for 
which an evidentiary hearing may be required. For example the 
Morley & McConkie, L.C. '"appraisal" is irreconcilably 
contradictory. (Regarding Section 16: "This parcel consists of 
land that is very irregular in terrain with steep sandstone 
cliffs and rocky terrain as well as some limited open space." 
Appraisal at p.3 "Parcel Three, located in the Capitol Reef 
National Park, has limited utility, if any." Appraisal, p. 6. 
The analysis then suggests selling Section 16 in 40-acre parcels, 
which would suggest 16 such parcels for the entire section. 
Appraisal, p.13. The appraisal does not reconcile the "limited 
open space," p.3, and the location of 16 40-acre parcels with the 
described development.) 
The Appraisal Review by Phillip Cook and Virginia 
Hylton, indicates some errors in the Morley & McConkie appraisal. 
We don't consider the appellants are limited in their analysis or 
criticism of the Morley & McConkie appraisal to comments in the 
Appraisal Review. We are considering witnesses who would testify 
regarding the character of the property, other appraisers or 
experts, and examination of Mr. McConkie. 
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M O Y L E & MOYLE (1934-1971) 
OF COUNSEL 
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josedem @ aof.com 
December 12, 2006 
LAW OFFICES OF 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Senior Attorney 
Page Two 
December 12, 2006 
When you have had an opportunity to review the 
accompanying statement, please call so that we might arrange 
times to discuss a stipulated statement. 
Very truly yours, 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Wayne G. Petty 
WGP\cb 
Enclosure 
cc: William J. Lockhart 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION 
[SITLAJ 
APPEAL FROM FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
BY THE SITLA DIRECTOR DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 2006 IN RE EXCHANGE 188 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 
CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION AND WILLIAM WOLVERTON REGARDING ISSUES 
OF FACT AND LAW TO BE DETERMINED IN THE ABOVE MATTER 
Pursuant to the JOINT STIPULATED SCHEDULING ORDER filed in the above matter, 
A. appellants National Parks Conservation Association ("NPCA") and William Wolverton 
submit the following preliminary statement of facts and issues presented by appellant's appeal 
from the Director's approval of an appraisal report regarding values of properties involved in 
Exchange 188 as sufficient to permit completion of that land exchange in fulfillment of SITLA's 
obligations under the order of the Utah Supreme Court in National Parks & Conservation 
Association v. Board of State Lands , 869 P.2d 909 (1992) ("NPCA case."); and 
B. appellants National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) submits the following 
preliminary statement of facts and issues presented by appellant's appeal from the Director's 
October 5, 2006 denial of NPCA's PETITION FOR A RULE CHANGE dated 18 January 2006 
[Hereafter, "rulemaking petition."] 
Appellants understand that, following this submission and a similar preliminary submission of 
facts and issues by counsel for SITLA, the parties will review the respective submissions for the 
purpose of submitting a joint statement of issues of both fact and law on which there is 
agreement between the parties, and on which there is disagreement, by 16 January 2007. 
APPEAL REGARDING EXCHANGE 188 
I. ISSUES OF FACT 
A. Background facts pertinent to issues in the NPCA case that are relevant to the parties' rights 
and duties in disposition of the lands at issue in Exchange 188, including facts regarding: 
1. NPCA's previous requests for declaratory rulings, actions by the Director and Board of State 
Lands, and judicial determinations, as established by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case. 
2. Any steps taken by SITLA to comply with the order and opinion of the Court in the NPCA 
case prior to the arrangements it made to obtain the "Limited Restricted Use Report" by Morley 
& McConlde [hereafter, "McConlde Report"] on which it relied for appraisal compliance and in 
support of its 15 September 2006 final agency action on Exchange 188. 
3. Actions taken by Garfield County in April 2006 to excavate fill material from approximately 
one-half acre of land in Section 16 for use in road work on the Burr Trail, constituting a direct 
violation of the stay of action in Section 16 entered by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA 
case. 
4. Any knowledge by SITLA or its responsible employees or officers regarding any actions by 
Garfield County that could reasonable be understood to constitute a violation of the stay of the 
Exchange 188 transaction entered by the Court in the NPCA case. 
5. Any steps taken by SITLA to seek remedies for or otherwise address any actions by Garfield 
County that could reasonable be understood to constitute a violation of the stay of the Exchange 
188 transaction entered by the Court in the NPCA case. 
6. Any steps taken by SITLA to comply with or fulfill the objectives of the guidance provided by 
the Supreme Court in the NPCA case to the following effect: 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archeological values that would have little economic value on the 
open market. In some cases, it would be unconscionable not to preserve and protect those 
values. It may be possible for the Division to protect and preserve those values without 
diminishing the economic value of the land. For example, with appropriate restrictions it 
may be possible for livestock grazing and perhaps even mineral extraction to occur on a 
school section without damaging archaeological and paleontological sites. But when 
economic exploitation of such lands is not compatible with the noneconomic values, the 
state may have to consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for school 
lands. Indeed, it might be necessary for the state to buy or lease the school lands from the 
trust so that unique noneconomic values can be preserved and protected and the full 
economic value of the school trust lands still realized. 
[869P.2d921] 
B. Facts relevant to determination of the "standing" of NPCA and of William Wolverton, 
including facts regarding: 
1. NPCA's role and continuing activities, on behalf of its members, seeking to protect Utah 
national parks, specifically including Capitol Reef National Park, from land ownership or 
development activities that may conflict with the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values 
for whose protection these parks are reserved. 
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2. NPCA's role and continuing activities and specific administrative steps and litigation efforts, 
on behalf of its members, taken to prevent development or road improvement activities on the 
Burr Trail, specifically including the road and adjacent areas in Section 16 and including its 
activities and litigation in the NPCA case challenging Exchange 188. 
3. Use and enjoyment of the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of Capitol Reef 
National Park, specifically including areas within Section 16, by NPCA members including 
William Wolverton. 
4. The interest and activities of NPCA and William Wolverton in taking action to ensure that the 
national park values they seek to protect, as described above, are not degraded as a result of 
unlawful activities, uses or occupancy on lands within Capitol Reef National Park. 
C. Facts relevant to the understanding and acceptance by SITLA and Garfield County of the 
value of lands purported to be exchanged in Exchange 188, including facts regarding: 
1. Garfield County's understanding and acceptance of the fact that the properties it would convey 
to SITLA in Exchange 188 were valued at a total of $661,000, based on the McConkie Report 
dated 25 August 2005. 
2. Whether Garfield County determined or claimed that it received or would receive any 
compensation for conveyance of its lands in Exchange 188 other than or in addition to SITLA5s 
conveyance to the County of Section 16, Township 34, Range 8 East. 
3. SITLA's understanding and acceptance of the fact that the properties it would convey to 
Garfield County in Exchange 188 were valued at a total of $200,000, based on the McConkie 
Report dated 25 August 2005. 
4. Whether SITLA determined or claimed that Garfield County received or would receive any 
compensation for conveyance of the County lands in Exchange 188 other than or in addition to 
SITLA's conveyance to the County of Section 16, Township 34, Range 8 East. 
5. Whether any other facts are pertinent to determining the lawfulness of the County's action in 
conveying land valued at $661,000 in exchange for acquiring land valued at $200,000, or to 
determining the validity of SITLA's action in approving those values for completion of 
Exchange 188. 
D. Facts pertinent to the lawfulness and adequacy of the "Limited Restricted Use Report" 
prepared by Morely and McConkie. L.C. for use as an independent and accurate appraisal of the 
values of the lands involved in Exchange 188 and for satisfaction of the requirement for an 
independent appraisal as ordered by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, including facts 
regarding: 
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1. All limitations or restrictions on the content and analysis of the McConkie report, and all 
"allowable departures" from the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practices, as 
recited in the McConkie Report, or otherwise adopted or utilized in rendering the McConkie 
Report for use by SITLA in connection with Exchange 188. 
2. All terms and conditions urged or required by SITLA or by Morley & McConkie applicable to 
the latter firm's preparation of the McConkie Report on which SITLA relied for compliance 
with the opinion and order of the Court in the NPCA case and in support of its 15 September 
2006 final agency action on Exchange 188. 
3. Any other oral or written understandings by or between SITLA and/or by Morley & 
McConkie and/or Garfield County regarding limitations on or allowable departures from the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, or regarding valuation expectations, 
which could have influenced the valuations reported in the Limited Restricted Use Report. 
4. Any communications from or by SITLA or its predecessor agency advising Garfield County 
that the value of properties it must offer to effectuate Exchange 188 must be increased to some 
approximate or designated value over and above the value of properties initially proffered by the 
County for Exchange 188. 
5. Any communications between Garfield County and SITLA or its predecessor agency 
regarding the reason for or purpose of Garfield County's interest in the exchange by which it 
could acquire Section 16. 
6. The steepness of the terrain within Section 16, and the extent of land and building sites witliin 
Section 16 with slopes at low enough gradient to permit feasible and lawful access and 
construction. 
7. Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
determined that despite the steepness of the Section 16 terrain, all or identified portions of the 
640 acres of Section 16 were sufficiently feasible for development or use as to be susceptible of 
sale in 40-acre lots as the basis for the values specified in the Report - and if so, the factual and 
analytical basis for that determination. 
8. Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
made any determination regarding the effect on land values in Section 16 resulting from the 
steepness of the terrain or the absence of water and utilities, and if so, the content of and factual 
and analytical basis for that determination. 
9. Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
made any inquiries, investigations or determinations regarding applicable regulatory restrictions 
governing construction on and use of the land within Section 16 that would or could result from 
exercise of regulatory authority over the land by the National Park Service in compliance with 
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the National Park Service Organic Act and other regulatory protections for the natural, scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational use of land within Capitol Reef National Park. And whether either 
Morley & McConkie or SITLA made any determination regarding the effect on land values in 
Section 16 that would or could result from such regulatory restrictions; and if so, the content and 
analytical basis for that determination. 
10. In considering and ultimately approving the McConkie Report and the values specified 
therein as satisfying the appraisal requirements imposed by the NPCA case, whether SITLA 
made any inquiries or investigation, gave any consideration, or made any determinations 
regarding the factors inquired about in paragraphs 5-9 above, or their effect on the adequacy of 
the appraisal and values for Exchange 188. If so, the content of any such inquiries or 
investigation , and the content and factual basis for any such determination. 
E. Facts regarding any consideration by SITLA of means to protect the natural scenic, aesthetic 
or recreational values of Section 16 while returning fair value to the school trust 
1. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
or reviewed the possibility of conveying Section 16 to the National Park Service or another entity 
that would provide protection of the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of that 
Section in return for fair value compensation to the school trust? 
2. If SITLA did consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, what arrangements for that 
purpose did SITLA consider, what decision was made, and what were the factual and legal 
grounds for that decision? 
3. If SITLA did not consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, was a specific decision 
made not to consider it, and what were the factual and legal grounds for that decision? 
4. In considering, or failing or declining to consider a fair value conveyance to an entity that 
could provide protection of Section 16's natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values, did 
SITLA give any consideration to the effect on the value of the section to the school fund that may 
result from regulatory restrictions on the use of Section 16 attributable to its presence within a 
national park? If so, what factors were considered; and if not, why not? 
5. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
and/or carried out any steps that would or were intended to provide protection of the natural, 
scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of Section 16. If so, what steps were taken; and if not, 
why not. 
6. Whether SITLA has adopted or applied any policies or practices for the purpose of protecting 
any kind of noneconomic values on any lands held subject to school trust obligations. If so what 
lands were or are involved, what policies or practices were adopted, and what if any legal 
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protections were or are applicable to those lands other than or in addition to SITLA's policies or 
practices? 
7. In determining whether to approve the McConkie Report as the basis for the values involved in 
Exchange 188, did SITLA have any legal authority to reject or cancel that exchange and enter 
into a transaction for conveyance of Section 16 , at fair value, to the National Park Service or 
other purchaser committed to protecting the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values on 
that section? 
II. ISSUES OF LAW 
A. With regard to the background facts and legal considerations arising from the NPCA case: 
1. Whether under the remand for a new appraisal ordered by the Supreme Court in the NPCA 
case, or under any other legal requirement, SITLA was legally required by its earlier transaction 
with Garfield County to complete Exchange 188 despite the unlawfulness of the appraisal on 
which the exchange was first based. 
2. After the Supreme Court invalidated the lawfulness of the first appraisal, did SITLA or its 
predecessor thereafter have lawful authority to seek invalidation of the conveyance to Garfield 
County and approve a different transaction by which Section 16 could be conveyed for fair value 
to the National Park Service or another entity with a commitment to protect the natural, scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational values of that section. 
3. Whether a violation by Garfield County of the terms of the stay entered by the Supreme Court 
in the NPCA case could legally affect any obligation SITLA might have had to remain bound by 
its earlier decision to convey Section 16 to Garfield County? 
4. Whether, in determining the future disposition of Section 16, SITLA had any legal obligation 
to consider or explain its judgment regarding the factors and possible steps for protection of the 
noneconomic values of that Section discussed by the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case? 
B. Whether NPCA and William Wolverton have standing to appeal the SITLA agency action 
approving the Morley and McConkie "Limited Restricted Use Appraisal Report" as the basis for 
completing Exchange 188. 
1. Based on the standing of NPCA and standing concepts established in the NPCA case. 
2. Based on application of the concepts and analysis of the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Chapter 
of the Sierra Club, et al v. Utah Air Quality Board, et al P.2d , 2006 UT 73 (Utah 
Supreme Court No. 20050454, Nov. 21, 2006). 
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C. Lawfulness of the compensation received by Garfield County under Exchange 188. and the 
effect of unlawful compensation on the validity of action by SITLA to approve the Exchange or 
to enter into an alternative transaction protecting Section 16 
1. Do the values approved for Exchange 188 in the Morley & McConkie Report, as approved by 
SITLA, render unlawful the conveyances by Garfield County in Exchange 188 because the 
County will received inadequate compensation for the lands it conveys in the Exchange? And is 
Garfield County thereby barred from completing, or required to reverse or renegotiate the 
transaction? 
2. If the transaction by Garfield County is unlawful because of inadequate compensation to the 
County, can SITLA lawfully participate in and claim the benefits of that inadequate 
compensation by approving and completing the exchange transaction on the basis of the values in 
the McConkie Report? Or does the unlawfulness of the transaction bar SITLA from completing 
it on those terms? 
3. Does SITLA's claimed legal obligation to maximize financial return to the school trust 
authorize it to participate in and benefit from transactions otherwise unlawful under state or 
federal law? 
4. If Exchange 188 cannot lawfully be completed on the basis of the values in the McConkie 
Report, is SITLA then legally free to negotiate a different disposition of Section 16? 
5. If Exchange 188 cannot lawfully be completed on the basis of the values in the McConkie 
Report, could SITLA then lawfully conclude a transaction for fair value conveying the Section to 
the National Park Service or another entity committed to protecting the natural, scenic, aesthetic 
and recreational values of that Section, including if SITLA receives full value for the Section? 
6. If SITLA is legally free to negotiate a protective disposition of Section 16, does the Supreme 
Court's decision in the NPCA case require it to give consideration to the factors that support such 
a disposition, including: 
(a) SITLA's authority to approve such a transaction, as reflected in any comparable practice 
of modifying use or disposition of trust lands for protection of archeological sites or to 
comply with other regulatory or policy goals ; 
(b ) the limitations on value of Section 16 likely to arise from the regulatory restrictions that 
will constrain the economic value of any development within Capitol Reef National Park, 
and the continuing costs involved in disputing or litigating such regulatory constraints; 
©) the limitations on value of the section arising from its precipitous terrain; 
(d) the limitations on value of the section arising from the unavailability of utility service and 
water; 
(e) the tourist value to the state of a public policy of protecting national parks by preserving 
nearby properties rather than subjecting them to incompatible development; 
(f) the greater feasibility of negotiating a fair value transaction with a solvent protective 
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entity at the reduced value likely to result from the various factors inadequately 
considered by the Morley & McConlde Report, including: 
* the restrictions and "allowable departures" from proper appraisal practice as 
acknowledged in that Report; 
* the steepness of the terrain and resulting diminished development value; 
* the unavailability of access to utilities and water. 
D. The legal adequacy of the McConlde Report to support Exchange 188 - specifically, whether 
the various inadequacies of the Report in failing to consider factors important to valuation render 
the Report inadequate as an appraisal that can satisfy the Supreme Court's mandate in the NPCA 
case. 
APPEAL REGARDING PETITION FOR A RULE CHANGE 
I. ISSUES OF FACT 
A. Facts regarding NPCA filing of its January 18, 2006 PETITION FOR A RULE CHANGE, the 
Director's October 5, 2006 letter of denial (with attachments), and NPCA's October 18. 2006 
Appeal from that denial. 
B. Facts regarding the factors considered by the Director in denying NPCA's rulemaking 
petition: 
1. Whether the Director considered any facts, or made any inquiries or studies about the 
management constraints or limitations of use that may be applicable to state trust lands held 
within national parks or the other management units for which this rule was proposed by NPCA. 
2. Specifically, whether the Director made any inquiries, studies or determination regarding uses 
and activities on state trust lands that may be prohibited or regulated within such management 
units, and how such prohibitions or regulations may limit or diminish remunerative use, lease, 
exchange or sale of such trust lands. 
3. Specifically, whether the Director made any inquiries, studies or determinations regarding the 
effect of such prohibitions or regulations on the fair or appraisal value of state school trust lands 
held within national parks or the other management units for which this rule was proposed by 
NPCA. 
4. Whether the Director's response to NPCA's rulemaking petition misunderstood or otherwise 
erroneously responded on the mistaken premise that NPCA seeks a rule that would give 
preference to protection of noneconomic values over return to the trust in managing school trust 
lands held within national parks or the other management units for which this rule was proposed 
by NPCA. Specifically, whether the Director understood that NPCA's rulemaking petition 
would provide occasion to consider whether better advantage to the school fund could come from 
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a protective disposition of the sort proposed in the rule than from retention of properties subject 
to often-rigorous regulatory restrictions on activities and uses. 
5. Whether the Director sought or obtained any legal advice regarding the extent of regulatory 
authority that may be exercised for the protection of noneconomic values within national parks 
and the other management units for which the rules was proposed. 
C. Incorporation of pertinent fact issues from NPCA's Preliminary Statement Regarding Issues of 
Fact and Law to be determined in the pending APPEAL FROM FINAL AGENCY ACTION BY 
THE SITLA DIRECTOR DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 2006 IN RE EXCHANGE 188. 
Certain aspects of the NPCA/Wolverton appeal from the Director's action approving the 
McConkie Report as the basis for Exchange 188 are highly pertinent in illustrating facts and 
considerations which NPCA contends should be taken into account by SITLA in its decision 
regarding NPCA's rulemaking petition. Thus, the fact issues listed in this section duplicate, and 
are numbered in brackets] to conform to the parallel Preliminary Statement of Facts filed with 
respect to NPCA'S appeal on Exchange 188. They include facts regarding the following 
[Paragraph A, Issue 6] 
Any steps taken by SITLA to comply with or fulfill the objectives of the guidance provided by 
the Supreme Court in the NPCA case to the following effect: 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archeological values that would have little economic value on the 
open market. In some cases, it would be unconscionable not to preserve and protect those 
values. It may be possible for the Division to protect and preserve those values without 
diminishing the economic value of the land. For example, with appropriate restrictions it 
may be possible for livestock grazing and perhaps even mineral extraction to occur on a 
school section without damaging archaeological and paleontological sites. But when 
economic exploitation of such lands is not compatible with the noneconomic values, the 
state may have to consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for school 
lands. Indeed, it might be necessary for the state to buy or lease the school lands from the 
trust so that unique noneconomic values can be preserved and protected and the full 
economic value of the school trust lands still realized. 
[869P.2d921] 
[Paragraph B]. Facts relevant to determination of the "standing" of NPCA and of William 
Wolverton, including facts regarding: - (All listed issues.) 
[Paragraph D, Issue 9] 
Whether Morley & McConkie, in preparing the McConkie Report, or SITLA in approving it, 
made any inquiries, investigations or determinations regarding applicable regulatory restrictions 
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governing construction on and use of the land within Section 16 that would or could result from 
exercise of regulatory authority over the land by the National Park Service in compliance with 
the National Park Service Organic Act and other regulatory protections for the natural, scenic, 
aesthetic and recreational use of land within Capitol Reef National Park. And whether either 
Morley & McConkie or SITLA made any determination regarding the effect on land values in 
Section 16 that would or could result from such regulatory restrictions; and if so, the content and 
analytical basis for that determination. 
[Paragraph E:] 
Facts regarding any consideration by SITLA of means to protect the natural, scenic, aesthetic or 
recreational values of Section 16 while returning fair value to the school trust - All listed issues, 
as follows: 
1. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
or reviewed the possibility of conveying Section 16 to the National Park Service or another entity 
that would provide protection of the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of that 
Section in return for fair value compensation to the school trust? 
2. If SITLA did consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, what arrangements for that 
purpose did SITLA consider, what decision was made, and what were the factual and legal 
grounds for that decision? 
3. If SITLA did not consider the possibility discussed in paragraph 1, was a specific decision 
made not to consider it, and what were the factual and legal grounds for that decision? 
4. hi considering, or failing or declining to consider a fair value conveyance to an entity that 
could provide protection of Section 16's natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values, did 
SITLA give any consideration to the effect on the value of the section to the school fund that may 
result from regulatory restrictions on the use of Section 16 attributable to its presence within a 
national park? If so, what factors were considered; and if not, why not? 
5. Whether, after the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the NPCA case, SITLA considered 
and/or carried out any steps that would or were intended to provide protection of the natural, 
scenic, aesthetic and recreational values of Section 16. If so, what steps were taken; and if not, 
why not. 
6. Whether SITLA has adopted or applied any policies or practices for the purpose of protecting 
any kind of noneconomic values on any lands held subject to school trust obligations. If so what 
lands were or are involved, what policies or practices were adopted, and what if any legal 
protections were or are applicable to those lands other than or in addition to SIMLA'S-policies or 
practices? 
7. hi determining whether to approve the McConkie Report as the basis for the values involved in 
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Exchange 188, did SITLA have any legal authority to reject or cancel that exchange and enter 
into a transaction for conveyance of Section 16 , at fair value, to the National Park Service or 
other purchaser committed to protecting the natural, scenic, aesthetic and recreational values on 
that section? 
II. QUESTIONS OF LAW 
A. Pertinent to SITLA's legal authority to adopt a rule of the kind and for the purpose proposed 
by NPCA: 
1. Whether the Director properly held that exercise of authority to adopt a rule of the kind and 
for the purpose proposed by NPCA would be incompatible with SITLA's obligations to the 
school trust, or would impermissibly "limit the full discretionary authority of the Agency to 
"manage, maintain, or dispose" of trust assets. 
2. Whether SITLA or the Director actually possesses "full discretionary authority" to "manage, 
maintain, or dispose" of trust assets where those assets are comprised of lands held within 
various state and national management units whose designated managers are empowered with 
regulatory authority committed to protect noneconomic values on those lands. 
3. In what way would the consideration of fair value exchanges for the purpose and as proposed 
by NPCA (or with permissible amendments) contradict or defeat SITLA' obligation to manage 
trust lands for the benefit of the school trust? If there is a rule that so rigidly forbids such 
consideration, has SITLA undertaken to adopt that rule through the rulemaking process as 
required by the Utah Rulemaking Act at sec. 63-46a-3(g)? 
4. Whether, and the extent to which, the regulatory authority available to managers of national 
parks or other protective management units may lawfully be exercised to prohibit or restrict 
activities or uses of state school trust lands within those units in a manner that may significantly 
reduce the value of those uses or of the affected trust lands, 
5. Whether, in considering a petition for rulemaking, SITLA's authority to consider the proposed 
rule is confined to the exact text of the rule as proposed, or whether SITLA may respond to the 
proposal with a modified version designed to address problems perceived in the original 
proposal? 
6. Whether the rule as proposed by NPCA was so far beyond SITLA's authority that SITLA was 
barred by rulemaking procedure, including Administrative Rule Rl5-2-5, from acting on the rule 
proposal by developing a modified rule more compatible with its authority and obligations. 
7. Was the Director correct in concluding that the SUWA case, on which he relies in his decision 
on NPCA's rulemaking petition, bars SIMLA from taking any actions based on considerations 
involving protection of noneconomic values? 
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7. hi the SUWA case, relied on by the Director in his decision on NPCA's rulemaking petition, 
the Board repeatedly emphasized that even under its present management practices, 
development prospects for school trust lands are often qualified by steps to comply with other 
regulatory requirements. (SUWA case, Order at 21.) What, if any, legal basis is there for 
concluding that SITLA has similar authority to take steps for adoption of a rule that would 
facilitate fair value dispositions of land as a means of avoiding the management conflicts 
associated with lands held within national parks or the other management units for which this 
rule was proposed by NPCA? 
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